Torts and Workmen\u27s Compensation: Workmen\u27s Compensation by Malone, Wex S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1956-1957 Term
December 1957
Torts and Workmen's Compensation: Workmen's
Compensation
Wex S. Malone
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Wex S. Malone, Torts and Workmen's Compensation: Workmen's Compensation, 18 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss1/25
19571 TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 71
was based upon the institution of a proceeding before the Louisi-
ana Board of Tax Appeals for the revocation of beer and liquor
permits issued to Nagim. In fact, Nagim had notified the New
Orleans miscellaneous revenue department that he no longer op-
erated the establishment, and a notation to that effect was made
in the record. It was conceded that Nagim's recovery would de-
pend upon his ability to show that statements made by defend-
ants in the revocation proceeding were made maliciously and
without probable cause. The evidence failed to establish this.
Plaintiff had failed to notify the State Department of Revenue
of his retirement from the operation, and the revocation action




PURCHASER'S COMPENSATION LIABILITY TO SELLER'S EMPLOYEES
For many years our courts have maintained the position that
the employee of the person who sells and delivers timber to a
buyer is not entitled to workmen's compensation from the latter
under R.S. 23:1061 (the provision of the statute subjecting a
principal to the compensation claim of his contractor's em-
ployee).' This position has resulted in numerous hardships
among those employed in the lumber industry. There has de-
veloped a fairly common practice by the Louisiana lumber buyer
of interjecting a middleman between himself and the owner of
the standing timber. Ownership of the timber is transferred to
this intermediary who, in turn, agrees to sever it and deliver it
by way of resale to the ultimate purchaser. Usually it is this
ultimate purchaser who initiates the entire transaction. Such
purchases are almost universally made solely on the credit of
the ultimate buyer. Usually such buyer withholds from money
due the intermediary a sum sufficient to pay the owner of the
standing timber, and this sum is paid directly to the latter. In
practical effect, the intermediary is no more than a contractor
who is paid for severing and hauling the timber. Yet, since the:
title passes through him, the courts have felt compelled to ex-
clude him from the classification of contractor, because he is.
regarded as a "seller." Apparently it is assumed that such a
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person cannot be a "seller" and a "contractor" at the same time.2
As a result, the employees of this intermediary must rely exclu-
sively upon the intermediary for compensation in the event of
injury or death, and, as might be suspected, the intermediary is
usually insolvent.
In recent years there is increasing evidence that lumbering
transactions such as described above are coming to be regarded
in court with a more skeptical eye. 8 The most recent example is
Jones v. Hennessy.4 Hennessy, a lumber buyer, induced the de-
ceased, its own former employee, an illiterate Negro, to move to
a new locality and to work for an intermediary who presumably
was cutting timber for sale to Hennessy. The latter provided
quarters and a line of credit for living expenses for the deceased
during much of this operation. It was not claimed, however, that
deceased was a direct employee of Hennessy. The court, in con-
cluding that the intermediary was not a seller to Hennessy with-
in the meaning of R.S. 23:1061, relied upon the fact that the
former had purchased a sawmill from Hennessy on credit. The
terms of the purchase arrangement for the mill were such that
as a practical result the intermediary was compelled to sell tim-
ber exclusively to Hennessy at the risk of losing his mill. It is
interesting to note that previous decisions of the courts of ap-
peal, in holding that the intermediary was in fact a seller to
defendant within the meaning of the statute, have ignored the
fact that an exclusive resale arrangement existed.5 From the
opinion in Jones v. Hennessy, it is difficult to determine whether
the court, in allowing compensation, was prompted to do so by
the exclusive character of the sale arrdngement, or whether it
was influenced by the fact that Hennessy interested himself in
procuring the services of the deceased for the intermediary, and
assisted in financing the deceased. The importance of the case
lies in the fact that the result reached suggests possibly that re-
sale arrangements of this type may be more critically scrutinized
in the future.
2. It is not clear why one person may not be both a seller and a contractor
with reference to another. Our courts have recognized that one may be the em-
ployee of another who has sold him goods when the seller controls the buyer's con-
duct in the reselling of the same goods. Buettner v. Polar Bar Ice Cream Co., 17
So.2d 486 (La. App. 1944). Similarily, a buyer may exercise control over a
worker hired to deal with goods while they are still in the ownership of the seller.
.Sizemore v. Kirkland Timber Co., 131 So. 501 (La. App. 1930).
8. Kline v. Dawson, 230 La. 901, 89 So.2d 385 (1956).
4. 232 La. 786, 95 So.2d 312 (1957).
5. Hatch v. Industrial Lbr. Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1941) ; Perkins v.
Hfllyer Deutsch Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1941).
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